Designed to introduce the reader to the critical issues of arms control and international security in the 1980s, this collection of provocative and challenging articles encourages a rethinking of conventional wisdom on strategic policy. The authors succinctly convey the tensions existing between those who would eliminate the weapons on which strategic deterrence has rested and those who see the Soviet nuclear buildup as a challenge that must be met with increased armaments. They reflect, as well, on the conceptual tension between eliminating nuclear weapons and answering the question of how defense can be managed in the nuclear era. Their contributions are at times compelling, at times frustrating, but at all times informative and of critical importance.

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

This book, first published in 1981, is a comprehensive examination of the main theoretical, methodological and empirical approaches to the study of the military in modernising political systems, in socialist and non-socialist countries. It analyses civil-military relations in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and China, and in doing so sheds new light on the comparative politics and strategic affairs of the Cold War period.

This book, first published in 1981, is a comprehensive examination of the main theoretical, methodological and empirical approaches to the study of the military in modernising political systems, in socialist and non-socialist countries. It analyses civil-military relations in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and China, and in doing so sheds new light on the comparative politics and strategic affairs of the Cold War period.

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

This book contains papers and comments presented at the Conference on International Security and Arms Control convened for the understanding of international security and arms control. The papers represent a wide diversity of subjects relevant to arms control. .

This book investigates the relationship between the Communist Party and the military establishment in the Soviet Union. It indicates that there are several factors influencing the dynamics of that relationship, and thus the respective roles of the protagonists.

This volume reflects the research and discussions for the Bellagio Conference, with a spcial emphasis on the distinct perspective introduced by the Europeans on the issues of superpower strategic relations in general and on MAD and SDI in particular. Their views are shaped by concerns on how these broader issues might affect their own national security interests.

Nuclear strategy and deterrence in their golden age -a nostalgically defined period sometime in the mid-1950s to mid-1960s - promised to harness and control the nuclear Moloch; hopes were high that the civilian strategists flooding into Washington would succeed in designing a new science of war that would safeguard national security, provide a stable international environment, and develop a rational decision-making process for the management of national interests in a hostile nuclear world. Three decades later, it is a commonplace that the erstwhile promises and pretensions of the nuclear whiz kids and the wizards of Armageddon have not lived up to expectations.

The Soviet Union, currently undergoing a period of transition, is faced with the need to overcome chronic problems both domestic and abroad that have been developing for many years. Wide-ranging and up-to-date, Soviet Politics takes a close look at all the major aspects of Soviet political life in the 1980s.